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REVERSE SILVER PLATTER: SHOULD EVIDENCE
THAT STATE OFFICIALS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF A STATE CONSTITUTION BE ADMISSIBLE IN A
FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIAL?
No subject in the criminal law engenders more controversy than the
exclusionary rule.' If federal or state officials obtained evidence in a
manner that violated a criminal defendant's fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 2 the federal exclusionary
rule, with several notable exceptions, 3 prevents federal or state prosecutors
from using the evidence against the defendant at trial.4 Similarly, state
1. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (costs of exclusionary
rule long have been source of concern); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 257-58 (1983)
(White, J., concurring) (because exclusionary rule denies jury access to probative evidence,
courts carefully must limit exclusionary rule's application); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's often quoted distillation of
exclusionary rule, in which he noted that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered"); LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of the Law ... Has Not...
Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L. REv. 255, 255 (law relating to searches and seizures has
caused judiciary more problems than any other area of law); Note, The Future of the
Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State Constitutional Law, 1987 Wis. L. REv.
377, 378 (exclusionary rule never has been popular remedy for unconstitutional searches and
seizures). Compare Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (unbending application of exclusionary rule
impedes functions of judge and jury) with id. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority's
strangulation of exclusionary rule indicates complete victory over fourth amendment).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (exclusionary rule is
inapplicable if officers rely in "good faith" on subsequently invalidated search warrant);
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448-50 (1984) (adopting "inevitable discovery" exception to
exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (refusing to apply exclusionary
rule in habeas corpus proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)
(exclusionary rule is inapplicable to grand jury proceedings).
4. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (unconstitutionally seized
evidence is inadmissible in state or federal courts); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
223 (1960) (evidence that state officers obtained during search, which would have violated
fourth amendment if federal officers had conducted search, is inadmissible in federal court);
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1921) (federal court should have granted
defendant's motion to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (if search and seizure violates fourth amendment,
prosecution shall not use evidence at all in federal court).
In addition to excluding evidence secured solely in violation of the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court also has applied
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courts exclude evidence that state or federal officials confiscated in vio-
lation of a state constitution.s Federal courts, however, uniformly refuse
to exclude evidence that state or federal officers obtained inconsistently
with state constitutions.6 Federal courts reason that excluding evidence
which officers obtained in violation of a state constitution would hamper
the enforcement of federal laws and would conflict with the need for
uniform evidentiary standards in the federal courts. 7 These federal courts
frustrate the right of individual states to provide independent constitutional
protection to their citizens, however, and encroach upon state sovereignty
and principles of federalism.' Additionally, federal courts that refuse to
exclude evidence which state officers obtained inconsistently with state
the exclusionary rule and excluded evidence obtained in violation of other constitutional
provisions or federal statutes. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (due process clause of fourteenth
amendment renders inadmissible evidence that officers obtained in violation of fourth
amendment); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) (if federal officers obtained
evidence contrary to Rule 5(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires
officers to present arrested person before magistrate without unnecessary delay, evidence is
inadmissible in federal court); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925) (fifth
amendment protects person from prosecutorial use of evidence obtained in violation of
person's rights under fourth amendment).
5. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, -, 520 P.2d 51, 62 (1974) (excluding
evidence that state officers obtained in violation of state constitution); State v. Johnson, 68
N.J. 349, 354, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (1975) (trial court should have determined whether state
officers obtained evidence in violation of state constitution and, if so, court should have
excluded evidence); State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980)
(if federal agents do not comply with state privacy standards that are stricter than federal
privacy standards, evidence that federal agents obtained is inadmissible in state court).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987)
(evidence that officers seized in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal court
without regard to state law); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987)
(only federal law applies to federal criminal prosecutions); United States v. Montgomery,
708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (if state officers conducted state search, federal courts
should determine whether search and seizure was reasonable as if federal officers conducted
search and seizure). But see United States v. Speaks, No. CR-86-273-1 (E.D. Wash. November
17, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (evidence that officers seized in violation of
Washington Constitution is inadmissible in federal court). The ruling of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Chavez-Vernaza effectively overruled the decision
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Speaks. See
infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's departure in Chavez-
Vernaza from its dicta in previous cases).
7. See United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (excluding
from federal court evidence that state officers obtained in violation of state constitution
would hamper enforcement of federal laws); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200,
204 (2d Cir. 1987) (excluding from federal court evidence that state officers obtained in
violation of state constitution would hinder need for uniform evidentiary standards in federal
courts); see also infra notes 92-154 and accompanying text (discussing Chavez-Vernaza and
Pforzheiner decisions).
8. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that federal courts'
refusal to exclude evidence which officers obtained in violation of state constitution is
inconsistent with historical concept of federalism).
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constitutions sanction a "silver platter" doctrine similar to the practice
that the United States Supreme Court invalidated in 1960. 9
Before 1960 state officials could transfer to federal agents on a "silver
platter" evidence that state officials obtained in violation of the United
States Constitution, and federal prosecutors could use the evidence in a
federal criminal trial.10 The Supreme Court in 1960, however, determined
that federal courts must exclude evidence which either state or federal
officers obtained in violation of the federal constitution." The Supreme
Court reasoned that, because evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution was inadmissible in federal court,
and because the fourth amendment applied to state officials, federal courts
must exclude evidence that state officials obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment.' 2 Despite the Supreme Court's attempt in 1960 to
eradicate the silver platter doctrine, by implementing a "reverse silver
platter," state officials currently can transfer evidence that they secured
in violation of a state constitution to federal agents, and federal officials
can use the evidence in federal court. 3 An examination of the United
States Supreme Court's repudiation of the original silver platter doctrine
demonstrates that federal courts similarly should renounce the new reverse
silver platter doctrine.'
4
The original silver platter doctrine developed because the United States
Supreme Court initially determined that the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution, and therefore the exclusionary rule, applied
only to federal officials.' 5 The exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court
established in Weeks v. United States6 was much narrower than the
modem exclusionary rule, which currently prevents federal or state pro-
secutors from using evidence that federal or state officials obtained in
violation of a criminal defendant's fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 7 The Weeks Court determined
9. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 214 (1960) (repudiating "silver platter"
doctrine); infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (discussing Elkins decision).
10. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (recognizing, but refusing
to repudiate, silver platter doctrine).
11. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
12. Id. at 214.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusing
to question in federal court whether state officers obtained evidence in compliance with
state law); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1372 (3d Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied
sub nom., Vespe v. United States, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); United States v. Bassford, 601 F.
Supp. 1324, 1333 (D. Me. 1985) (same).
14. See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying text (discussing original silver platter
doctrine).
15. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (framers did not direct
fourth amendment toward state officials' misconduct); infra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text (discussing Weeks decision).
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (authorities should
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that, after a defendant made a pretrial motion for the return of property
that a United States Marshal had seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, the admission of the property at trial as evidence against the
defendant also violated his fourth amendment rights.'8 The Court in Weeks
expressly circumscribed its holding, however, and recognized that the
fourth amendment applied only to the federal government and not to state
officials.' 9 In Wolf v. Colorado,20 however, the Supreme Court reversed
course and found that fourth amendment concepts apply to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2' Although
the Wolf Court concluded that fourth amendment concepts apply to the
states, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states as
the fourth amendment's enforcement mechanism. 22 Thus, after the Court's
decision in Wolf, if state officials seized evidence in violation of the fourth
amendment, a federal prosecutor still could use the evidence against a
defendant in federal court.23 This double standard had broad implications
have returned letters to defendant because authorities seized letters in violation of defendant's
constitutional rights) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (unconstitutionally seized
evidence is inadmissible in state or federal courts). Courts and commentators uniformly
credit the United States Supreme Court's decision in Weeks with establishing the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Supreme Court formulated exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (same); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 209 (1960)
(same); Abrahamson & Gutmann, The New Federalism: State Constitutions, 71 JUDICATURE
88, 95 (1987) (same); Note, supra note 1, at 380 (same). The Weeks decision technically did
not establish the rule prohibiting a federal court from admitting unconstitutionally seized
evidence at trial, however, but only determined that, if a defendant made a motion before
trial for the return of his property, a court should grant the motion. See Weeks, 232 U.S.
at 398 (holding that, after defendant made motion for return of property, trial court should
have restored property to defendant); see also Note, The Origin and Development of
Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally
Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REv. 459, 469 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Origin and
Development] (Weeks decision established that courts could not admit unconstitutionally
seized evidence in face of defendant's motion for return of property). Although the technical
holding of Weeks is now insignificant, the Supreme Court fully developed the exclusionary
rule in 1921 to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial. See Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921) (because defendant had no opportunity to make motion
for return of unconstitutionally seized evidence, admission of evidence at trial violated
fourth amendment); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1921) (court should have
granted defendant's motion at trial to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence).
18. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389.
19. Id.
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (fourth amendment concepts apply
to states through due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
22. See id. at 28 (exclusionary rule is not binding on states).
23. See id. (determining that trial court should not have returned to defendant evidence
which state officers seized). Although after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Weeks v. United States, evidence that state officials, without the aid of federal officials,
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment still was admissible in federal court, if a
federal court found that federal officials participated in an unlawful search and seizure, or
1502
REVERSE SILVER PLATTER
because courts uniformly recognized and encouraged cooperation between
state and federal authorities in criminal investigation. 24 Because federal
officials could prosecute defendants with unconstitutionally seized evidence
that state officers turned over to the federal authorities, Justice Frankfurter
commented in Lustig v. United States25 that state officers were handing
unlawfully seized but functional evidence to federal prosecutors on a
"silver platter.' '26 Although the Lustig Court did not alter the silver platter
doctrine's efficacy,27 the Supreme Court, only a few years later, invalidated
the doctrine that had resulted from the dichotomy between Weeks and
Wolf.28
The United States Supreme Court invalidated the original silver platter
doctrine in Elkins v. United States,29 in which the Court considered whether
evidence that state officers obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
should be admissible in a federal criminal trial.30 In Elkins state officers
had seized evidence under circumstances that the defendant claimed had
violated the federal constitution. 31 Federal prosecutors subsequently ob-
tained the evidence from the state officers, and used the evidence to
convict the defendant in federal court.3 2 The Elkins Court reviewed the
that state officers acted solely on behalf of the federal government in carrying out an
unlawful search and seizure, a federal court would apply the exclusionary rule. See Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (cooperation between federal and state officials in
unlawfully obtaining evidence reidered evidence inadmissible in federal trial); Gambino v.
United States, 275 U.S. 310, 319 (1927) (court excluded evidence that solely state officials
unlawfully seized because defendant's only possible offense was federal offense); infra note
35 and accompanying text (discussing federal "participation doctrine").
24. See, e.g., Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 386 (1961) (noting that, in Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act, Congress expressly commanded that federal officers
cooperate with state officials in criminal investigations and prosecutions); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960) (cooperation between state and federal agents in investigation
of criminal activity is commendable practice); United States v. Coppola, 281 F.2d 340, 345
(2d Cir. 1960) (for effective law enforcement, all state, county, city, or federal agencies
must cooperate and exchange information with each other).
25. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
26. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
27. See id. at 78-79 (recognizing, but refusing to repudiate, silver platter doctrine).
28. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 214 (1960) (repudiating silver platter
doctrine); infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing Elkins decision).
29. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960).
31. Id. at 207. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon in Elkins
v. United States did not determine -whether the state search and seizure violated the fourth
amendment because, under Wolf, the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to the states. Id;
see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (exclusionary rule is not binding on states).
The trial court in Elkins did find, however, that no federal participation in the state search
had occurred. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 207. The trial court's finding that no federal participation
had occurred was significant because federal participation in a state search would have
constituted a federal search that was subject to the fourth amendment and the exclusionary
rule. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing federal participation doctrine).
32. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 207. A state court of general criminal jurisdiction previously
had suppressed the evidence in Elkins after the state court found that the search warrant
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Weeks decision and determined that neither Weeks nor subsequent cases
prevented a federal prosecutor from taking advantage of the silver platter
doctrine? 3 Moreover, the Elkins Court recognized that the Court in Weeks
had determined that the fourth amendment did not apply to the conduct
of state officers? 4 The Court found, however, that the Court in Weeks
and its progeny could not have foreseen the practical difficulty that resulted
from federal courts' creation of the federal "participation doctrine," under
which federal courts, in an attempt to define a federal search, would apply
the exclusionary rule if federal officers had participated in an unlawful
search with state officers.3 5 Because the federal participation doctrine
required federal courts constantly to determine what level of federal
conduct constituted "participation," federal courts' application of the
doctrine was problematic.' 6 Additionally, the Court in Elkins recognized
that, by applying fourth amendment concepts to the states, the Wolf
decision seriously eroded the principle that state seizures do not violate
the federal constitution, a principle which was the foundation upon which
rested the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial.37 Because
the Weeks Court had determined that evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment was inadmissible, and the Wolf Court had applied
the fourth amendment to the states, the Elkins Court concluded that all
evidence which state or federal officers obtained during searches and
seizures that violated the federal constitution is inadmissible in federal
court.
3
The Elkins decision negated only one variation of the silver platter
doctrine, however, because under Wolf, state courts still were free to
admit evidence that state or federal officers seized in violation of the
federal constitution. 39 The Supreme Court's decision in Rea v. United
which the investigating officers used was invalid. Id. at 207 n.1. After state authorities
withdrew their indictment of the defendants, the federal officers in Elkins secured the
evidence in issue from a local bank where the state officers had placed the evidence. Id.
Federal prosecutors then used the evidence to convict the defendants in federal court. Id.
at 207.
33. Id. at 210-11.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 211. Under the federal participation doctrine that courts followed after
Weeks v. United States, if federal officers participated in an unlawful search and seizure
with state officers, a federal court would apply the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence
that the officers obtained. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (if federal
and state officials obtained evidence in joint operation by violating federal constitution,
court must exclude evidence). The United States Supreme Court subsequently extended the
participation doctrine to searches and seizures that solely state officers conducted if the
search and seizure appeared to be "on behalf of" the United States. See Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927) (because no possibility of state offense existed, search and
seizure by state officers was on behalf of federal government).
36. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 211.
37. Id. at 213.
38. Id. at 214.




States0 reflected the Court's continuing difficulty with a silver platter
problem that was different than the practice which the Elkins Court
invalidated.4' In Rea the Court considered whether a United States district
court should have enjoined a federal agent both from transferring unlaw-
fully obtained evidence to state authorities and from testifying in state
court.4 2 The Rea Court reasoned that the federal agent had violated a
federal rule, and that the power of the federal courts extends to enforcing
federal rules. 43 The Court in Rea concluded, therefore, that enjoining the
federal officer from testifying or transferring the evidence properly would
enforce federal rules. 44 Although the Rea decision addressed a violation
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than the federal con-
stitution, a similar injunction against a federal officer who unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence plainly would have been consistent with the Rea
Court's decision.45 Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to combat various
forms of the silver platter doctrine in Elkins and Rea, unconstitutionally
seized evidence remained admissible in state courts. 46 The Court next
addressed, therefore, what it thought was the final avenue of admissibility
for unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
47
40. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
41. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's decision in Rea v. United States).
42. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216 (1956).
43. Id. at 217. A federal officer in Rea had seized marijuana under an invalid search
warrant, and a fedeal district court later suppressed the evidence under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(e). Id. at 215; see FED. R. CiuM. P. 41(e) (person aggrieved by
unlawful search and seizure may make motion for return of unlawfully seized property).
The federal officer then swore out a complaint before a New Mexico state court judge, and
the New Mexico court charged the defendant with possession of marijuana. Rea, 350 U.S.
at 215. After the state proceeding, the defendant moved in the federal district court for an
order prohibiting the federal officer from testifying in the state court or transferring the
evidence to state officials. Id. at 216. The district court denied the motion, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial. Id.
44. Rea, 350 U.S. at 217.
45. See id. (injunction preventing federal agent from using, in state court, evidence
that federal agent obtained during illegal search and seizure was appropriate). Injunctive
relief is completely inadequate in silver platter cases because injunctive relief is effective
only if a defendant secures the relief before one sovereign's agents transfer the evidence to
another sovereign's agents. See Note, Expanding State Constitutional Protections and the
New Silver Platter: After They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the Window?, 8 Loy. U.
CHi. L.J. 186, 207 (1976). A state court must declare evidence inadmissible before injunctive
relief can be appropriate. Id. If state officers immediately after seizing evidence transfer the
evidence to federal officers or give the evidence to federal officials before instituting a
proceeding in state court, therefore, injunctive relief offers no remedy to a defendant. Id.
Once evidence arrives in an independent jurisdiction, a foreign court has no ability to enjoin
a trial court from admitting the evidence at trial. See Rea, 350 U.S. at 217 (stressing that
defendant did not seek injunction against state official).
46. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (exclusionary rule is not binding on
state courts).
47. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio).
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In determining whether to foreclose the admissibility of all unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence, in Mapp v. Ohio,4 the Court considered
whether state prosecutors could use evidence obtained in violation of the
federal constitution against a criminal defendant in a state court. 49 In
Mapp state officers obtained evidence in a manner that blatantly violated
the fourth amendment.5 0 The Court reviewed its previous fourth and fifth
amendment decisions, and recognized both Elkins' rejection of the original
silver platter doctrine and Rea's attempt to prevent federal agents from
transferring unconstitutionally seized evidence to state officials.5 Addi-
tionally, the Mapp Court noted that, although at the time the Court
decided Wolf almost two-thirds of the states were opposed to the exclu-
sionary rule, in the interim between Wolf and Mapp, over one-half of the
states had adopted some form of an exclusionary rule.5 2 The Court in
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645-46 (1961).
50. Id. at 644-45. After calling her attorney, the defendant in Mapp v. Ohio told the
police officers who knocked on her door that she would not admit them to her house unless
they had a search warrant. Id. at 644. The officers left the defendant's premises, but
maintained surveillance of the defendant's home. Id. The officers returned to the defendant's
premises a few hours later and forcibly entered the house. Id. The defendant in Mapp
demanded to see a search warrant and, after one of the officers held up a piece of paper,
the defendant grabbed the paper and thrust it into her blouse. Id. After a struggle, the
officers finally retrieved the paper from the defendant and handcuffed her. Id. at 644-45.
The officers in Mapp then conducted a complete search of the house, and seized some
obscene materials that prosecutors later used to convict the defendant of possession of
obscene matter. Id. at 645. The prosecution never produced a search warrant at the
defendant's trial, and never mentioned whether a warrant ever had existed. Id. The prose-
cution in Mapp conceded that the search and seizure was unconstitutional, but cited the
Wolf decision for the proposition that unconstitutionally seized evidence was admissible in
a state court. Id.
51. Id. at 653. In its extensive review of prior decisions, the United States Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio explored virtually all of the landmark Supreme Court cases that
had formulated the exclusionary rule. Id.; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223
(1960) (if state officers obtained evidence and violated fourth amendment, evidence is
inadmissible in federal criminal trial); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956)
(determining that lower court should have granted injunction prohibiting federal agent from
transferring unconstitutionally seized evidence to state authorities or from testifying in state
court); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (concepts of fourth amendment are
enforceable against states through due process clause of fourteenth amendment); McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (federal conviction founded upon unconstitution-
ally seized evidence cannot stand); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928)
(decision in Weeks effectively proscribed government's introduction of evidence if govern-
ment officials obtained evidence by violating fourth amendment); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (prosecution cannot use unconstitutionally seized
evidence in any manner); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (prosecution's
use at trial of unconstitutionally seized evidence denied accused his constitutional rights);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (fourth and fifth amendments together
extend to all government invasions of person's home and privacy).
52. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. The Mapp Court relied on the states' voluntary adoption
of their own exclusionary rules in determining whether the federal constitution required all
the states to follow the exclusionary rule. Id. The Supreme Court in Mapp, therefore, used
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Mapp then explicitly addressed the inequity of what it thought was the
last vestige of the silver platter doctrine." The Supreme Court recognized
that, although Weeks prohibited a federal prosecutor from using unlaw-
fully seized evidence in federal court, under Wolf a state prosecutor across
the street could use the same evidence in state court.14 The Mapp Court
determined that this needless inconsistency both encouraged disobedience
to the Constitution and undermined sound principles of federalism. 55 In
imposing the exclusionary rule upon the states, the Supreme Court in
Mapp concluded that the exclusionary rule was an integral part of both
the fourth and fourteenth amendments, 56 and expressed the Court's inten-
tion to foreclose the only remaining method for a court to admit evidence
that officials obtained in violation of the Constitution.
57
The bright line rule that the Supreme Court established in Mapp did
not signal the end of intersovereign or silver platter problems with the
admission of evidence, however, because criminal defendants also have
rights under the various state constitutions.s The protection of individual
liberties under state constitutions ordinarily is similar in content and
operation to that of the federal constitution.5 9 State courts also enforce
state constitutional protection as a basis for interpreting the federal constitution. Id; see
Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 42 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 285, 309-
10 (1987) (recognizing that states' courts sometimes serve as laboratory for federal consti-
tutional development). A federal court's decision to exclude evidence that state officers
obtained in violation of a state constitution, therefore, would be consistent with the Mapp
Court's use of state constitutional interpretation as a basis for developing federal constitu-
tional values. Kaye, supra, at 311.
53. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-58.
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id; see infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (federal courts' refusal to exclude
evidence that state officers obtained in violation of state constitution is inconsistent with
established principles of federalism). In Mapp v. Ohio the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Court's previous cases demonstrated that the dichotomy between Weeks
and Wolf invited federal officers to approach the state's attorney with unconstitutionally
seized evidence because the evidence still would be admissible in state court, and that federal
officers often did transfer unconstitutionally seized evidence to state prosecutors. Mapp,
367 U.S. at 658; see Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 386-87 (1961) (distinguishing Rea
and refusing to restrain federal officer from testifying in state court about evidence that
federal officer unlawfully obtained).
56. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
57. Id. at 654-55.
58. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (state constitutions are source of individual liberties and
provide protection beyond United States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law);
Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights, 16
U. TOL. L. REv. 465, 469 (1985) (function of state constitutions is to provide protection
for individual rights beyond federal constitution's protection); Note, Federalism, Uniformity,
and the State Constitution, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 569, 570 (1987) (in federalist system, state
declarations of rights afford double security to people).
59. See, e.g., Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 17, at 90 (drafters of federal Bill
of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in state constitutions); Brennan, supra note
58, at 501 (same); Note, supra note 45, at 196 (same).
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state constitutional protection with state exclusionary rules.6 If state or
federal officials acquire evidence in violation of a state constitution,
therefore, state courts will suppress the evidence.
61
While the rights that state constitutions grant to state citizens often
are identical to the rights guaranteed in the federal Bill of Rights, state
constitutional rights are not necessarily identical to their federal counter-
parts because state and federal courts have independent judicial power.
6 2
Moreover, although the United States Supreme Court ultimately is re-
sponsible for interpreting the federal constitution, 63 the highest court of a
state is the final authority on that state's constitution. 4 A state supreme
court has, therefore, independent and complete authority to interpret the
state's constitution. 65 Consequently, a state court may provide greater
protection for state citizens than the federal constitution provides. 66 By
60. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, __, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955)
(California courts must exclude evidence that officers obtained in violation of state or
federal constitution); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 407, 143 N.E. 112, 117 (1924) (if
officers obtained evidence in manner that violated defendant's protection under state con-
stitution, evidence is inadmissible in state court); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354, 346
A.2d 66, 68 (1975) (trial court should have determined whether officers violated defendant's
state constitutional rights and, if court found violation, court should have excluded evidence).
61. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 552, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114-15, 119
Cal. Rptr. 315, 330-31 (1975) (excluding evidence that officers obtained in violation of
California Constitution); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, __, 113 So. 704, 706 (1927) (Florida
courts must exclude evidence that officers obtained in violation of Florida Constitution);
People v. Winterheld, 359 Mich. 467, -, 102 N.W.2d 201, 202 (1960) (if state officers
obtained evidence in violation of Michigan Constitution, evidence is inadmissible in Michigan
courts).
62. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (determining that, under
state constitutions, states may impose higher standards on searches and seizures than federal
constitution mandates); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, -, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974)
(interpreting Hawaii Constitution to provide to criminal defendants greater protection than
federal constitution provides to criminal defendants in same circumstances); State v. Johnson,
68 N.J. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (interpreting provision of New Jersey Consti-
tution to provide greater protection than federal counterpart).
63. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803) (Supreme Court of United
States has final authority to interpret federal constitution).
64. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (if state court decision plainly
indicates that court based decision on state law, United States Supreme Court will not review
decision).
65. See, e.g., id. (United States Supreme Court will not review state court decisions
that rest on state grounds); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976) (recognizing
that Supreme Court of South Dakota has final authority to interpret South Dakota Consti-
tution); Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 17, at 88 (state courts have legitimate and
independent authority to construe state constitutions).
66. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 368 (1976) (reaffirming California courts' responsibility independently to define
and protect rights of California citizens despite conflicting United States Supreme Court
interpretation of federal constitution); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d
51, 58 n.6 (1974) (because of principle of federalism, national constitution tolerates state
courts' divergence under state law from United States Supreme Court's explication of
Constitution if result is greater protection of individual rights under state law than under
1508
REVERSE SILVER PLATTER
determining that its state constitution provides greater protection than the
federal constitution, a state court can exclude evidence even though the
seizure of the evidence did not violate the federal constitution. 67 A new
federal law); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (interpreting
provision of New Jersey Constitution to provide greater protection for state citizens than
federal counterpart provides).
67. See State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976) (excluding evidence
under South Dakota Constitution although United States Supreme Court previously had
held that evidence was admissible under federal constitution). In South Dakota v. Opperman
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless search of an impounded
automobile for inventory purposes violated the fourth amendment. South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976). In Opperman state police impounded the defendant's car
for overtime parking. Id. The officers then unlocked the car and conducted an inventory
search of the car's entire contents. Id. The United States Supreme Court in Opperman noted
that, before conducting a search of the defendant's impounded car, an officer saw a watch
on the automobile's dashboard, as well as other items of personal property in the backseat.
Id. Although these circumstances ostensibly made the search necessary for the defendant's
protection, the Court's holding in Opperman did not require that, to conduct an inventory
search, officers have reason to believe that something of value was in a car. Id. at 376.
Rather, the Court broadly validated all inventory searches because the searches were standard
police procedure throughout the country. Id. The police officers in Opperman discovered
marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment, and state prosecutors subsequently convicted
the defendant for marijuana possession. Id. at 366. The defendant in Opperman moved to
suppress the evidence that the officers had obtained during the inventory search of his
impounded automobile on the ground that the inventory search violated the fourth amend-
ment to the federal constitution, but the trial court denied the defendant's motion, finding
that the inventory search did not violate the fourth amendment. Id. The Supreme Court of
South Dakota reversed the defendant's conviction, determining that the officers' inventory
search violated the fourth amendment. State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, -, 228 N.W.2d
152, 159 (1975). Because the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the trial court's
decision on the ground that the inventory search of the defendant's automobile violated the
federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal
and granted certiorari. South Dakota v. Opperman, 423 U.S. 923 (1975); cf. supra note 64
and accompanying text (if state court plainly indicates that its decision rests solely upon
state law, United States Supreme Court cannot review decision).
In reversing the Supreme Court of South Dakota's interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court in Opperman reasoned that the Constitution provided
less protection for automobiles than for homes or offices because of automobiles' mobility
and because people have a lower expectation of privacy in their cars. Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 367; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (motor vehicles afford less expectation
of privacy to vehicle owners because vehicles ordinarily do not serve as residences or
repositories for personal effects); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1971)
(automobiles' mobility renders strict enforcement of warrant requirement impossible); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (determining that, for constitutional purposes,
because officers could immobilize car and seek warrant, officers could conduct immediate
search of car without warrant); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967) (because
police validly had impounded automobile as evidence, officers' search of automobile without
warrant was constitutional); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (because
automobiles and vehicles are inherently mobile, officers may search automobiles and vehicles
without warrant in certain circumstances). The Court in Opperman recognized that, for the
public's safety and convenience, police officers must remove vehicles that impede the free
flow of traffic. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. The Opperman Court also recognized that
officers have a routine practice of securing and inventorying the contents of impounded
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reverse silver platter problem occurs, however, if state officials transfer
to federal officers evidence that state officials seized unlawfully under a
automobiles. Id. The United States Supreme Court in Opperman found that the standard
practice of inventory searches developed in response to the need to protect an owner's
property while it was in police custody, to protect the police from subsequent claims for
lost or stolen property, and to protect the police from possible danger that firearms,
explosives, or some other instrumentality might cause. Id; see Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61-62
(because police validly had impounded automobile as evidence, officers' search of automobile
was constitutional); United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1972) (standard
inventory search of automobiles fulfills goals of protecting defendants' property and pro-
tecting police from automobile owners' claims); United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960,
961 (9th Cir. 1972) (police action that safeguards valuable property in plain sight is
constitutional). Because police officers had a legitimate need to conduct inventory searches
of lawfully impounded automobiles, and because a majority of courts had found that
inventory searches were constitutional, the Court in Opperman concluded that inventory
searches were reasonable under the fourth amendment and remanded the case to the Supreme
Court of South Dakota. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
In State v. Opperman the Supreme Court of South Dakota considered on remand
whether the inventory search of the defendant's automobile violated the South Dakota
Constitution. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). The Opperman court
recognized that the United States Supreme Court's decision that inventory searches do not
violate the federal constitution was binding on the Supreme Court of South Dakota. Id.
The court in Opperman also recognized, however, that the Supreme Court of South Dakota
had the power to provide greater protection of individual rights than the federal constitution
mandated because the South Dakota court was the final authority on the South Dakota
Constitution. Id. After balancing the need for the inventory search against the scope of the
intrusion, the Opperman court determined that the scope of the officers' search had been
too broad. Id. at 675. Although the relevant language in the South Dakota Constitution
was virtually identical to the language in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Opperman court recognized that the Supreme Court of South Dakota still
had the right independently to interpret the language. Id. at 674; see supra note 2 (setting
forth language of fourth amendment to United States Constitution); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ It (unreasonable search and seizure provision in South Dakota Constitution). The Op-
perman court then determined that a warrantless inventory search could extend only to
articles that were in plain view inside an automobile. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d at 675. Because
the inventory search was too broad, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Opperman
affirmed its original decision that excluded the evidence in issue. Id. Significantly, the
Opperman court reached its conclusion even though the defendant failed to argue for the
application of state constitutional law during his first appeal. Id. Although the defendant
in Opperman did not argue or brief the possible application of the South Dakota Constitution
to the state search and seizure, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Opperman granted
a rehearing to allow both sides an opportunity to address the issue. Id. The Opperman court
determined that it had the inherent power on remand to order a rehearing on a subject that
was of great significance to citizens of South Dakota. Id. at 675 n.6. By applying state
rather than federal constitutional law, therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
Opperman effectively declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's ruling on exactly
the same facts. See id. at 674 (noting United States Supreme Court's decision in Opperman,
but recognizing that Supreme Court of South Dakota has no obligation to follow United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding South Dakota Constitution). Compare South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (concluding that complete inventory search
of impounded automobile did not violate fourth amendment to United States Constitution)
with State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976) (concluding that complete
inventory search of impounded automobile violated South Dakota Constitution).
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state constitution.68 In determining the admissibility of state-seized evi-
dence, federal courts will examine only whether state officers violated
federal law. 69 State officers that violate a state constitution but not the
federal constitution in seizing evidence, therefore, can give the evidence
to federal officers, who can use the evidence in federal court.70 A historical
analysis of state constitutional protection, however, reveals that federal
68. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987)
(state officers transferred to federal officers evidence that state officers obtained in violation
of state law); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United
States v. Montgomery, 708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); see also infra notes 92-
154 and accompanying text (discussing Chavez-Vernaza and Pforzheimer decisions).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1985) (determining
that, if evidence is admissible under federal law, federal court cannot exclude evidence);
United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1380 (lth Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1108 (1983); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369, 1372 (3d Cir. 1975) (in criminal cases,
federal courts apply federal law to decide evidentiary questions), cert. denied sub nom.,
Vespe v. United States, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
70. See United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming defen-
dant's conviction in federal court after state court excluded evidence that state officers
obtained in violation of state law). The United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio
could not foresee the new reverse silver platter doctrine because, at the time the Court
decided Mapp, and for several years thereafter, the Supreme Court was expanding the
federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See infra note 75 and accompanying
text (noting that, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, United States Supreme Court in 1950s
and 1960s applied Bill of Rights to states, thus greatly expanding federal protection of
individual liberties). The expansion of federal rights obviated the need for state high courts
to engage in independent protection of the individual rights of state citizens. See infra note
76 and accompanying text (noting that, because United States Supreme Court was expanding
federal protection of individual rights, state courts in 1950s and 1960s had little or no
incentive independently to interpret state constitutions as providing greater protection of
individual rights than federal constitution). After expanding federal rights for several years,
however, the Supreme Court began to curtail the individual rights of criminal defendants,
and thus has eviscerated many of its prior rulings. See infra note 77 and accompanying text
(observing that, under Chief Justice Warren Burger, United States Supreme Court in 1970s
and 1980s substantially curtailed federal protection of individual liberties). The Supreme
Court has continued this process of limiting its prior decisions and particularly has limited
the scope of the exclusionary rule. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing Supreme
Court decisions that have limited application of exclusionary rule). In response, state courts
increasingly have held that their own state constitutions provide greater protection to state
citizens than the protection that the federal constitution provides, thus effectively refusing
to follow United States Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974)
(because of principle of federalism, national constitution tolerates state courts' divergence
under state law from United States Supreme Court's explication of Constitution if result is
greater protection of individual rights under state law than under federal law); State v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976) (recognizing Supreme Court of South Dakota's
power to provide greater protection for state citizens under state constitution than federal
constitution provides); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court of
South Dakota's refusal to interpret search and seizure clause in South Dakota Constitution
consistently with United States Supreme Court's interpretation of fourth amendment to
federal constitution, despite identical language of South Dakota Constitution).
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courts should repudiate the new reverse silver platter doctrine.7'
Because recent decisions in which state courts have held that their own
state constitutions provide greater protection than the federal constitution
do not represent a new trend in state constitutional protection, but rather
represent the renewal of an old trend, the reverse silver platter doctrine
is incongruous with the origin and purpose of state constitutional protec-
tion.72 State bills of rights preceded the federal Bill of Rights, and several
states adopted their own exclusionary rules well before the emergence of
the federal exclusionary rule.73 Because the United States Supreme Court
historically had held that the federal constitution applied only to the
federal government, the protection of individual liberties under the federal
constitution was limited. 74 Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, however, the United States Supreme Court gradually applied the
federal Bill of Rights to the states, greatly expanding federal constitutional
protection of individual liberties. 7 Because federal protection of individual
rights greatly was expanding, state courts had little or no incentive inde-
pendently to interpret state constitutions as providing greater protection
than the federal constitution.7 6 During the past two decades, however,
under Chief Justice Warren Burger, the United States Supreme Court
generally has curtailed rather than expanded the federal constitutional
protection of individual rights. 77 As a result of this curtailment, state
71. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text (explaining why federal courts that
admit evidence which state officers seized in violation of state constitution subvert principles
of federalism and underlying purpose of federal Bill of Rights).
72. See Note, supra note 58, at 571 (describing "rebirth" of state court reliance on
state constitutions); infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that reverse
silver platter doctrine is incompatible with origin and purpose of state constitutional
protection).
73. See Sedler, supra note 58, at 468 n.14 (prior to United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, several states had adopted exclusionary rule as matter of state
law).
74. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (federal
Bill of Rights applies only to federal government); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914) (framers did not intend federal constitution to regulate actions of state officials).
75. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 193 (Warren Court applied majority of protections
contained in Bill of Rights to states through fourteenth amendment).
76. See Note, supra note 58, at 571 (because federal protection of individual liberties
rapidly expanded, state court decisions relying on state constitutions declined in number).
The State of Washington adopted the exclusionary rule in 1922. See State v. Gibbons, 118
Wash. 171, 188-89, 203 P. 390, 396 (1922) (Washington courts must exclude evidence that
officers obtained in violation of defendants' state constitutional rights). After the United
States Supreme Court applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, however, Wash-
ington abandoned its own exclusionary rule and exclusively relied on the federally mandated
exclusionary rule. See Note, Origin and Development, supra note 17, at 465 (after United
States Supreme Court applied exclusionary rule to states, Washington Supreme Court stopped
using state exclusionary rule and solely relied on fourth amendment to United States
Constitution in excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence).
77. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 58, at 495 (recent United States Supreme Court
decisions curtail enforcement of federal Bill of Rights to states); Whitebread & Heilman,
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courts have reestablished their independent ability to provide to state
citizens greater protection under state constitutions than exists under the
federal constitution.
7 8
Federal courts that refuse to exclude evidence which state officers
obtained in violation of a state constitution, however, impede state courts'
historic duty to provide independent protection to state citizens. 79 Each of
the original thirteen states had adopted a constitution before the adoption
of the United States Constitution. All of these state constitutions con-
tained specific provisions that protected individual liberties from state
government encroachment. 8' The drafters of the Constitution, therefore,
actually based the federal Bill of Rights upon already existing provisions
in various state constitutions. 2 Although the United States Supreme Court's
subsequent application of most of the federal Bill of Rights to the states
appears inconsistent with established principles of federalism, which man-
date separate and independent state and federal sovereigns, state courts
retain their historic duty to provide independent protection to their citi-
zens.8 3 State constitutional protection is illusory, however, if federal of-
The Interpretation of Constitutional Rights-Reflections on the Burger Court's Counterrev-
olution in Criminal Procedure, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 935, 935-46 (1986) (discussing Burger
Court's attack on Warren Court's expansion of individual rights); Note, supra note 58, at
571 (Burger Court limited protective doctrines that Warren Court developed). But see
Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HA~v. L. REv. 1436,
1441 (1987) (Burger Court's anticipated attack on Warren Court expansion of individual
rights never materialized).
78. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 368 (1976) (reaffirming California Supreme Court's responsibility separately to
define and protect rights of California citizens despite conflicting United States Supreme
Court interpretation of federal constitution); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520
P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974) (federalism of national constitution tolerates divergence from United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal constitution if result is greater protection
of individual rights under state law than under federal law); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349,
353, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (interpreting provision of New Jersey Constitution to provide
greater protection of individual rights than federal constitution provides); Abrahamson &
Gutmann, supra note 17, at 88 (in 1970s state courts rediscovered their legitimate authority
independently to interpret state constitutions); Note, supra note 59, at 571 (after Burger
Court reversed Warren Court expansion of individual rights, state courts renewed reliance
on state constitutions).
79. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (state constitutional protection of
individual liberties preceded adoption of federal constitution and Bill of Rights).
80. See Note, Individual Rights and State Constitutional Interpretations: Putting First
Things First, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 497 (1985) (all thirteen states had adopted constitutions
by 1784).
81. See Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 955 (1982)
(original state constitutions guaranteed individual liberties to state citizens); Shapiro, State
Constitutional Doctrine and the Criminal Process, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 630, 637-44
(1986) (detailing origins and specific protections of early state declarations of rights).
82. See Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 17, at 90 (in drafting Constitution,
framers drew heavily on state constitutions); Kaye, supra note 52, at 289 (in drafting federal
Bill of Rights, framers mirrored language in corresponding state bills of rights).
83. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (A. Hamilton) (envisaging that states would
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ficials can prosecute state citizens with evidence that state officers obtained
unlawfully. 4 Because federal and state prosecutors have concurrent ability
to prosecute defendants for the same offenses, federal use of unlawfully
obtained evidence does not differ materially from state use of the same
evidence. 5 Consequently, federal courts that allow federal prosecutors to
use evidence which a state court would have excluded on state constitu-
tional grounds impinge upon state courts' historic ability to provide state
constitutional protection to state citizens.86
In addition to impeding state courts' historic duty to provide inde-
pendent constitutional protection to state citizens, federal courts that admit
evidence which state officers seized in violation of a state constitution also
ignore the reason that the states requested and ratified the federal Bill of
Rights.87 Because state constitutions already contained provisions that
protected individual liberties, the protection that a federal bill of rights
would afford state citizens at first appeared unnecessary.8 State guarantees
remain primary guardians of life and property); Sedler, supra note 58, at 469 (function of
state constitutions is to provide protection beyond that which federal constitution provides);
Note, supra note 58, at 570 (nature of federalist system affords double protection to people);
Note, supra note 80, at 495-96 (because both state and federal governments are sovereign,
individual rights receive dual protection).
The United States Supreme Court's application of the federal Bill of Rights to the states
is not necessarily inconsistent with original principles of federalism. See Brennan, The Bill
of Rights: State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11
(1987) (enactment of fourteenth amendment represented adoption of James Madison's desire
to limit arbitrary state power). Through the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court applied the Bill of Rights to the states. Id. Additionally, the
states did not ratify the fourteenth amendment until some 79 years after the adoption of
the Constitution. Id. The adoption of the fourteenth amendment and its use as a conduit
for the Bill of Rights, therefore, did not represent an attack on federalism, but rather the
desire of Congress to establish a uniform, minimum level of protection that the states could
expand if they wished. See id. (although primary concern that led to adoption of fourteenth
amendment was fear that former Confederate states would deny protection under state
constitutions to newly freed persons, drafters of fourteenth amendment also had in mind
more general application of fourteenth amendment to protect individual liberties of all
persons).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to exclude from federal court evidence that state officers obtained unlawfully under
state law); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United
States v. Montgomery, 708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); see also infra notes 92-
154 and accompanying text (discussing Chavez-Vernaza and Pforzheimer decisions).
85. See T. GARDNER AND V. MANIAN, CRNNAL LAW 200-01 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing
great overlap between nature of state and federal crimes, which causes problems in deter-
mining which set of authorities should prosecute given case).
86. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussing origin and role of state
constitutional protection).
87. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (because states requested federal Bill
of Rights to protect state citizens from federal government, federal courts that admit
unconstitutionally gathered state evidence negate underlying purpose of Bill of Rights).
88. See, e.g., Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 17, at 94 (many delegates at
constitutional convention thought pre-existing state guarantees of individual liberty obviated
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of individual liberties did not apply to the newly formed federal govern-
ment, however, so the framers added to the Constitution the federal Bill
of Rights to protect citizens from the federal government's actions. 9
Allowing federal prosecutors to use evidence that state officers obtained
in violation of a state constitution, therefore, thwarts the underlying
purpose of the federal Bill of Rights, which is to protect state citizens'
individual liberties from the federal government.90
Recent federal decisions that allow federal prosecutors to use evidence
which state officers obtained in violation of a state constitution not only
ignore historic concepts of federalism and constitutional law, but are
grounded on reasoning that is less than compelling.9' For example, in
United States v. Chavez- Vernaza92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon should have suppressed evidence that state agents
obtained in violation of state law. 93 In Chavez-Vernaza Oregon police
officers obtained copies of the defendant's financial records in a manner
that possibly violated state law. 94 A federal grand jury subsequently
need for federal guarantees of individual liberty); Kaye, supra note 52, at 289 (when framers
drafted federal constitution, framers thought Bill of Rights was unnecessary because state
constitutions already protected individual rights); Note, supra note 80, at 497 (because of
existing state protection of individual liberties, original draft of federal constitution contained
no bill of rights).
89. See, e.g., Abrahamson & Gutmann, supra note 17, at 94 (framers wanted federal
Bill of Rights to restrain federal government); Ziegler, Constitutional Rights of the Accused-
Developing Dichotomy Between Federal and State Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 241, 245 (1977)
(noting James Madison's argument that state bills of rights would not protect individuals
from federal government); Note, supra note 80, at 497 (purpose of federal Bill of Rights
was to provide same protection against federal government that people had against state
governments).
90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (framers desired federal Bill of Rights
to protect individual rights from federal government abuse).
91. See infra notes 92-154 and accompanying text (no compelling reasoning underlies
recent decisions that allow federal courts to admit evidence that state officers obtained in
violation of state constitutions).
92. 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).
93. United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987). Although
the state law that the investigating officers violated in Chavez-Vernaza was a state statute,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both explicitly and by citing cases
that dealt with violation of state constitutions, intended its holding to extend to evidence
that state officers obtained in violation of a state constitution. See id. at 1373-74 (evidence
that state officers obtained in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal court
without regard to state law).
94. Id. at 1371. In Chavez-Vernaza state officers investigated the defendant for possible
involvement in cocaine distribution. Id. at 1370. The officers obtained evidence, including
certain financial records, that demonstrated the defendant's involvement in broad drug-
related activities. Id. Oregon law prohibited financial institutions from providing their
customers' financial records to any state or local agency, and prohibited state and local
agencies from requesting such information. Id. at 1371; OR. Ray. STAT. §§ 192.555 (a) and
(b) (1987). The Oregon statute additionally provided that any evidence obtained in violation
of the statute was inadmissible in any proceeding. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1371; OR.
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indicted the defendant on eleven alleged violations of federal drug laws. 9
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Chavez-
Vernaza's motions for disclosure of the method by which the state officers
obtained the financial records and for suppression of the records.96 In
determining whether evidence that the state officers secured in violation
of state law was admissible in federal court, the court in Chavez-Vernaza
noted that the Ninth Circuit consistently had held that, if federal officers
acting together with state officers obtained evidence in violation of state
law, but in accordance with federal law, the evidence was admissible in
federal court. 97 The Chavez- Vernaza court recognized, however, that the
Ninth Circuit never explicitly had decided whether evidence that state
officers without the aid of federal officers seized in violation of state law
was admissible in federal court. 9
REv. STAT. § 192.590(5) (1987). Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit ever
determined whether the Oregon officers in Chavez-Vernaza actually violated the Oregon
statute, because the courts regarded the possible violation of state law as irrelevant. Chavez-
Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374; see infra notes 99-124 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Chavez- Vernaza that violation of state law is irrelevant to determination
whether evidence is admissible in federal court).
95. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1370. The federal grand jury in Chavez-Vernaza
indicted the defendant for violating the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act and for attempting to import cocaine. Id.; see Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1982) (prohibiting unauthorized manufacture or
distribution of controlled substances); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (authorizing same punishment
of person that aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures another to commit
crime against United States as for principal wrongdoer).
96. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1370.
97. Id. at 1372; see, e.g., United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (9th Cir.)
(if state and federal officials acted in concert, evidence that officials obtained in violation
of state law but in compliance with federal law is admissible in federal court), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 951 (1986); United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218 (1984); United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200,
201 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983); see also infra notes 106-10
and accompanying text (discussing reasons that courts should differentiate between evidence
that state officers obtained alone and evidence that state officers obtained together with
federal officers).
98. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1372. Although the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit never specifically had determined whether evidence that state officers
without federal assistance seized in violation of state law was admissible in federal court,
the Ninth Circuit previously had suggested, in dicta, that federal courts should exclude such
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983) (in
interest of comity, federal court should apply state's more stringent exclusionary rule if
state officers without assistance of federal officers secured evidence), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1218 (1984); United States v. Cordova, 650 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1981) (state law governs
admissibility in federal court of evidence that state officers seized); United States v. Orozco,
590 F.2d 789, 792 n.11 (9th Cir. 1979) (traditional rule in Ninth Circuit has been that state
search and seizure is subject to both state and federal law in federal prosecution). The
Ninth Circuit's apparent predisposition toward the exclusion of evidence that state officials
obtained in violation of state law, a predisposition that the court plainly abrogated in
Chavez-Vernaza, had caused one federal district court in the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction to
exclude such evidence. See United States v. Speaks, No. CR-86-273-1 (E.D. Wash. November
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The Ninth Circuit in Chavez-Vernaza examined four rationales for a
federal court to admit evidence that state officers obtained in violation of
state law. 99 First, the court reasoned that, because the Ninth Circuit
uniformly had admitted evidence which state officers together with federal
officers had obtained in violation of state law, no sound reason existed
to treat differently a search in which state officers acted alone.' °° Second,
the Chavez-Vernaza court determined that applying the exclusionary rule
to evidence which state officers obtained in violation of state law would
hamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering inadmissible
in federal court relevant and reliable evidence.101 Third, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that federal interest in uniform evidentiary standards in the
federal courts outweighed possible federal deference to a more stringent
state exclusionary rule. 0 2 Finally, the court in Chavez-Vernaza recognized
that the other federal circuit courts uniformly admitted evidence that state
officers obtained in violation of state law, and expressed the Ninth Circuit's
desire not to create an unnecessary conflict with the other circuits. 03 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit in Chavez-Vernaza concluded that evidence which either
state or federal officers seized in compliance with federal law is admissible
in federal court without regard to state law.'04
All four of the Ninth Circuit's bases for admitting into federal court
evidence that state officers seized in violation of state law are tenuous. 05
First, the Chavez-Vernaza court could find no reason to treat differently
evidence that state officers, while acting alone, obtained in violation of
17, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (citing Ninth Circuit's dicta in Henderson,
Cordova,and Orozco and determining that evidence which officers seized in violation of
Washington Constitution was inadmissible in federal court).
99. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1373-74.
100. Id. at 1373; see infra note 107 and accompanying text (listing Ninth Circuit
decisions to admit evidence that state officers acting together with federal officers obtained
in violation of state law).
101. See Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374 (adopting reasoning of United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Rickus); see also United States v.
Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) (determining that excluding evidence which state
officers obtained in violation of state law would hamper enforcement of federal laws).
102. See Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374 (adopting reasoning of United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Pforzheimer); see also United States
v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that federal interest in uniform
evidentiary standards in federal courts outweighed possible deference to principle of feder-
alism); infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing Pforzheimer decision).
103. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1373-74; see, e.g., United States v. Pforzheimer, 826
F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) (federal policy considerations support application of federal
law in federal trials); United States v. Rickus, 7-37 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying
state exclusionary rule in federal trial would hamper enforcement of valid federal laws);
United States v. Montgomey, 708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (in federal trials courts
should measure state officers' conduct against same standard of reasonableness against which
courts measure federal officers' conduct).
104. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374.
105. See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's lack of
convincing reasoning in Chavez- Vernaza).
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state law and similar evidence that state and federal officers obtained
together, which federal courts uniformly admit. 0 6 As the Ninth Circuit's
previous cases reflect, however, a basis for differentiating between the two
situations does exist.10 Because federal officers by virtue of the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution are subject only to federal law,
the manner in which federal officers obtain evidence is not subject to state
restriction. 0  By specifically regulating the actions of state officers, how-
ever, state law restricts state officers' conduct. 0 9 Federal courts that admit
evidence which solely state officers obtained, therefore, render state re-
striction of state officers ineffective." 0
106. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1373; see infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text
(federal courts should differentiate between evidence that state officers obtained alone and
evidence that state and federal officers obtained together).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (9th Cir.) (if state and
federal officials act in concert, evidence obtained in violation of state law but in compliance
with federal law is admissible in federal court), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 951 (1986); United
States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1218 (1984); United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200, 201 (9th Cir. 1982) (same),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had determined before the court's decision in Chavez-Vernaza that a joint search by state
and federal officers was not subject to state constitutional requirements because state
participation did not convert a federal search into a state search. See United States v. Hall,
543 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1976) (search that federal officers conducted is subject to
federal law even if state officers participated in search); see also infra note 108 and
accompanying text (supremacy clause of United States Constitution precludes application of
state law to federal officers). The traditional rule in the Ninth Circuit before Chavez-
Vernaza, however, was that a federal court must judge a purely state search and seizure by
both state and federal standards. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 792 n.1 (9th Cir.
1979).
108. See United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200, 202 n.* (9th Cir. 1982) (state courts
cannot determine bounds of admissibility of evidence in federal court), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1118 (1983); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Although the supremacy clause precludes a state from forcing a
federal court to exclude evidence that state officers obtained inconsistently with state law,
federal courts may nevertheless exclude such evidence out of concern for comity and
federalism. See Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination,
42 CORN LL L.Q. 346, 363 (1957) (because federal courts exclude relevant evidence to restrain
federal officers from unconstitutional activity, federal courts should respect state courts'
attempts to exclude evidence to restrain state officers from unconstitutional activity).
109. See Note, supra note 58, at 570 (state law protects state citizens from state
government's actions).
110. See United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983) (if federal
courts allow state officers to turn illegally seized evidence over to federal authorities, federal




The Ninth Circuit's second tenuous basis for admitting the state-seized
evidence was that, by excluding evidence because state officials obtained
the evidence in violation of state law, a federal court unduly would burden
the enforcement of valid federal laws."' Because a rule excluding from
federal court evidence that state officials secured in violation of a state
constitution only infrequently would apply, however, this reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit is unconvincing. ' 2 If federal officers, whose primary re-
sponsibility is the investigation and enforcement of federal laws, seized
evidence in compliance with federal law, a federal court will admit the
evidence."' A federal court will exclude evidence only if state officers
acting alone seized evidence in violation of state law and then turned the
evidence over to federal prosecutors." 4 Because state officers ordinarily
seize evidence for state prosecutions, excluding evidence in the rare in-
stances in which state officers transferred unlawfully seized evidence to
federal prosecutors would not place an inordinate burden upon the en-
forcement of federal laws.1
5
The Ninth Circuit's third rationale in Chavez-Vernaza for admitting
evidence obtained unlawfully under state law, that a need for uniform
federal evidentiary standards outweighed interests of comity and deference
to state law, also is not persuasive." 6 The Ninth Circuit failed to note
that, because of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," 7 any federal court potentially must apply the
law of all fifty states on any number of issues." 8 The Erie doctrine requires
111. See Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374 (adopting reasoning of United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Rickus); see also United States v.
Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) (determining that excluding relevant and reliable
evidence would hamper enforcement of federal laws).
112. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (because rule excluding evidence
that state officers unlawfully obtained rarely would apply, rule would not burden enforcement
of federal laws).
113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (because of supremacy clause of
Constitution, federal officers are subject only to federal law, and therefore, evidence that
federal officers seized in accordance with federal law is admissible in federal court).
114. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (by excluding evidence that state officers
obtained in violation of state law, federal courts could eliminate incentive for forum
shopping).
115. See Note, supra note 80, at 496 (state courts and officers owe allegiance to state
law).
116. See Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374 (adopting reasoning of United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Pforzheimer); see also United States
v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) (federal policy considerations such as need
for evidentiary uniformity outweigh interests of comity and deference to state law); infra
notes 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in Pforzheimer).
117. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
118. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (in all cases that federal law
does not specifically govern, federal courts should apply state law, including state common
law). The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Erie is difficult to overstate
because federal courts' application of Erie is so extensive. See J. WRaT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 255 (3d ed. 1976) (Erie decision has affected almost
all federal civil cases since United States Supreme Court decided case).
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federal courts in civil cases to apply state law to all substantive issues." 9
Applying state constitutional law in a search and seizure case undoubtedly
would pose no more difficulty for federal courts than does the Erie doctrine
generally. 120
Finally, the Chavez-Vernaza court disingenuously based its decision to
admit in federal court evidence that state officers obtained in a manner
contrary to state law on a desire not to create a needless conflict with the
other federal circuits. 21 Although a desire not to create conflicts with
other circuits is admirable, the federal circuits often conflict on various
issues, many of which do not involve constitutional rights or the depri-
vation of individual liberties. 22 The Chavez- Vernaza court failed to explain
why creating a conflict based on respect for established principles of
federalism and the constitutional protection of individual liberties is any
more "needless" than other issues of law about which the circuits disa-
gree.1 23 The Ninth Circuit in Chavez-Vernaza, therefore, offered little
convincing reasoning in support of its refusal to respect state constitutional
protection of state citizens.
124
In reaching its decision to admit in federal court evidence that state
officers obtained in violation of state law, the Ninth Circuit in Chavez-
Vernaza relied upon the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
119. See Note, supra note 45, at 201 (Erie doctrine requires federal courts to apply
state substantive law to civil cases).
120. See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, supra note 118, § 55, at 256 (noting lower federal courts'
difficulty with application of subsequent Supreme Court cases interpreting Erie); Boner,
Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEx. L. REv. 619, 635 (1962) (Erie
doctrine's status among practicing attorneys rose to that of religion); Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 512 (1954) (Erie doctrine has no
apparent limitations and decisions interpreting doctrine are unclear).
121. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1373-74.
122. See Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1417,
1421 (1987) (in determining meaning of amendment to Internal Revenue Code provision,
three federal circuit courts found three different meanings, and District of Columbia Circuit
itself split three different ways on same issue). Intercircuit conflicts today are prevalent
among the circuit courts. See Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court,
100 HARv. L. REv. 1400, 1407 (1987) (caseload of one federal circuit court in one year
included 90 decisions conflicting with decisions of other circuits, 36 of which were original
conflicts). The problem of intercircuit conflicts has become so pervasive that, because the
United States Supreme Court cannot resolve all of the conflicts, commentators advocate the
establishment of a new federal court. See id. at 1416 (urgent need exists for new Intercircuit
Panel to resolve conflicts among circuits); Ginsburg & Huber, supra, at 1417-35 (describing
proposed Intercircuit Panel, which would resolve conflicts among federal circuits). Although,
as the Chavez-Vernaza court suggested, federal circuit courts should not create needless
conflicts, that conflicts are so widespread undercuts the ingenuity of conflicts-avoidance as
a basis for decision. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374; see Baker & McFarland, supra, at
1407 (under "law of the circuit," previous decisions from same circuit are binding while
previous decisions from other circuits only are persuasive).
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (federal circuit courts often disagree
on variety of issues).




for the Second Circuit in United States v. Pforzheimer.125 Like the Ninth
Circuit in Chavez-Vernaza, however, the Second Circuit in Pforzheimer
offered little compelling reasoning in reaching its conclusion that a federal
court should admit evidence which state officers obtained in violation of
a state constitution. 126 The Second Circuit in Pforzheimer considered
whether, in federal court, state constitutional law applied to a search and
seizure that only state officers conducted. 27 In Pforzheimer state officers
seized a large quantity of marijuana on the defendant's property in a
manner that the defendant claimed had violated his state constitutional
rights. 28 Although state authorities charged the defendant with violations
of state drug laws, the state officials dropped the charges after federal
agents charged the defendant with similar violations of federal drug laws.
29
Federal prosecutors convicted the defendant in the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont. 30 The defendant appealed the district
court's decision in Pforzheimer and argued that the Second Circuit should
apply state, rather than federal, constitutional law in evaluating the legality
of the state search and seizure.' Like the Ninth Circuit in Chavez- Vernaza,
the court in Pforzheimer recognized that, although the Second Circuit
previously had held that only federal law applied if federal officers had
participated in a search and seizure, the Second Circuit never specifically
125. 826 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1987); see Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1374 (adopting
reasoning of United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v.
Pforzheimer).
126. See infra notes 127-54 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision
in Pforzheimer).
127. United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
128. Id. In Pforzheimer Vermont officials had begun investigating the defendant and
his brother for drug-related activity three years before the search and seizure in issue. Id.
State officials had charged the defendant with drug violations after the first investigation,
but the state authorities later dropped all charges when a state court suppressed the evidence
in question. Id. State authorities based the warrant in Pforzheimer upon information that
state officers obtained by surreptitiously trespassing upon the open fields of the defendant's
property. Id. The United States Supreme Court previously had determined that a trespass
upon "open fields" did not violate the federal constitution. See Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (search of open fields does not violate Constitution). The Vermont
Supreme Court, however, never had determined whether a search of open fields violated
the Vermont Constitution. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 202. Because the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pforzheimer agreed with the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont that federal law, including the decision in Oliver, applied,
neither court addressed the question of whether the search in issue actually violated the
Vermont Constitution. Id.
129. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 201. State authorities in Pforzheimer gave no specific
reason for dropping the Vermont drug charges, but stated simply that they dropped the
charges because federal officials were prosecuting the defendant. Id; see supra note 85 and
accompanying text (noting great overlap between nature of state and federal crimes).
130. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 202. The jury in Pforzheimer convicted John Pforzheimer
of knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana in an amount less than 50 kilo-
grams. Id.
131. Id. at 202.
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had decided whether only federal law applied if federal officers did not
participate. 32 In determining this issue of first impression, the Pforzheimer
court first cited United States Supreme Court decisions which support the
general principle that federal law applies to federal prosecutions. 3 3 Second,
the court in Pforzheimer determined that other federal circuit courts
uniformly admitted evidence that state officers obtained in violation of a
state constitution. 3 4 Finally, the Pforzheimer court reasoned that the need
for uniform evidentiary standards in the federal courts outweighed interests
of comity in respecting Vermont constitutional law. 35 The Second Circuit
in Pforzheimer concluded, therefore, that only federal law should apply
to a prosecution in federal court, even if only state officials conducted
the search and seizure.'
3 6
All of the Second Circuit's justifications for admitting evidence that
state officers unlawfully obtained, however, are unconvincing. 37 The Pfor-
zheimer court first cited United States Supreme Court decisions which
generally reflect the proposition that, in federal trials, courts should
evaluate searches and seizures as if federal officers made the searches and
seizures. 38 The Second Circuit in Pforzheimer recognized that, in the cited
cases, the Supreme Court addressed not whether evidence that state officers
obtained in violation of a state constitution should be admissible in federal
court, but whether evidence that state officers obtained in violation of the
federal constitution should be admissible in federal court. 39 The Second
132. Id. at 203.
133. ld; see Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964) (in federal trials courts
should measure state officers' conduct against same standard of reasonableness against which
courts measure federal officers' conduct); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960)
(federal law governs federal courts' determination of whether search and seizure was
unreasonable).
134. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 204.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text (explaining why Second Circuit's
reasoning in Pforzheimer is unconvincing).
138. Id; see Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964) (in federal trials courts
should measure state officers' conduct against same standard of reasonableness against which
courts measure federal officers' conduct); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960)
(federal law governs federal court's determination of whether search and seizure was
unreasonable).
139. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 203. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Pforzheimer correctly recognized that Elkins v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court held that evidence which state officials seized in violation of the federal
constitution is not admissible in federal court, did not address the question of whether a
state constitution could restrict the admissibility of evidence in a federal trial. 1d; see Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 214 (1960) (if state officers seized evidence in violation of
United States Constitution, evidence is inadmissible in federal court). The Second Circuit in
Pforzheiner maintained, however, that Elkins reflected the general proposition that federal
law governs federal prosecutions. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 203. The general premise that
federal law governs federal prosecutions is indisputably true, but it is not dispositive, because
the Erie doctrine alone constitutes an exception that may have swallowed the general rule.
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Circuit failed to recognize, however, that, in the cited cases, the Supreme
Court expanded the protection of individual liberties by limiting the use
of unlawfully gathered state evidence in federal criminal trials.1 40 Addi-
tionally, the Pforzheimer court failed to recognize that the Erie doctrine
already is a vast exception to the general rule that federal law governs
federal trials.141 Because the Supreme Court's objective in the cited cases
was antithetical to the Second Circuit's decision, and because a rule
excluding evidence obtained in violation of a state constitution simply
would constitute another exception to the general rule that federal law
governs federal trials, the Second Circuit's citation of isolated language
in Supreme Court opinions constitutes a specious analysis of the admission
of evidence obtained in a state search and seizure.
42
As a second ground for admitting in federal court evidence that state
officers seized in violation of a state constitution, the Second Circuit
recognized the unanimity among the other circuits on the issue. 143 The
See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (noting vast application of Erie doctrine as
exception to general rule that federal law applies in federal courts).
140. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (excluding evidence that
officers obtained from defendant's automobile because search was too remote in time and
place from arrest); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 214 (1960) (determining that
evidence which state officers obtained in violation of federal constitution is inadmissible in
federal court).
141. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting United States Supreme Court's
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which, by forcing federal courts to apply state
law in most civil cases, is major exception to rule that federal law applies in federal courts).
142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (United States Supreme Court in Preston
and Elkins expanded protection of individual liberties); supra note 141 (exceptions already
existed to general rule that federal law governs federal prosecutions).
143. United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987); see, e.g., United
States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (Ist Cir. 1985) (federal court should not exclude evidence
that is admissible under federal law despite inadmissibility of evidence under state law);
United States v. Montgomery, 708 F.2d 343, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (in federal trials courts
should measure state officers' conduct against same standard of reasonableness against which
courts measure federal officers' conduct); United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 578 (6th
Cir.) (states cannot impose state law requirements on federal courts), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
Il1 (1982). The Pforzheimer court recognized, but declined to adopt, the Ninth Circuit's
dicta in previous cases that favored excluding evidence which state officers obtained in
violation of a state constitution. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 203-04; see United States v.
Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983) (in interest of comity, federal courts should
apply state's more stringent exclusionary rule if state officers without assistance of federal
officers secured evidence in violation of state law), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218 (1984);
United States v. Cordova, 650 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1981) (state law governs admissibility
in federal court of evidence that state officers seized). After Pforzheimer, the Ninth Circuit
abandoned its previous language and joined the other federal circuit courts in determining
that all evidence which state or federal officers obtained in compliance with federal law is
admissible in federal court. See United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th
Cir. 1987) (evidence that officers seized in compliance with federal law is admissible in
federal court without regard to state law); supra notes 92-124 and accompanying text
(discussing Ninth Circuit's decision in Chavez-Vernaza); see also United States v. Rickus,
737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying state exclusionary rule in federal trial would
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Pforzheimer court failed to note, however, that, although the federal
circuits agree that evidence which state officers obtained in violation of a
state constitution is admissible in federal court, the United States Supreme
Court never has considered the question, and the circuit courts often split
on various other issues. 44 Although precedent is an important element in
judicial decisions, courts should not substitute a reflexive adherence to
precedent for sound, independent reasoning.
45
The Second Circuit in Pforzheimer also evaluated the defendant's
argument that the admission against him of unlawfully secured evidence
would encourage state prosecutors to turn over their unlawfully obtained
evidence to federal prosecutors. 146 The Pforzheimer court reasoned that,
because state prosecutors have no authority to prosecute in federal court,
the defendant's argument was unpersuasive. 47 The Second Circuit did not
acknowledge, however, that, whether state or federal authorities prosecute
a defendant is of little consequence because the result to the defendant
effectively is identical.148 A state prosecutor does not have authority
actually to prosecute a defendant in federal court, but if a court allows a
state agent to transfer unlawfully obtained evidence to a federal prosecutor
who then can convict a defendant for the same offense with the same
evidence, the court encourages prosecutorial forum shopping with evidence
that state officers obtained unlawfully under state law. 149
Finally, the Second Circuit in Pforzheimer emphasized the need for
uniform evidentiary rules in the federal courts. 50 Because the Vermont
Supreme Court never had considered whether the situation in Pforzheimer
violated the Vermont Constitution, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
court had no guidance in determining whether the search and seizure
hamper enforcement of valid federal laws); United States v. Montgomery, 708 F.2d 343,
344 (8th Cir. 1983) (in federal trials courts should measure state officers' conduct against
same standard of reasonableness against which courts measure federal officers' conduct).
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting that federal circuits often
disagree on variety of issues).
145. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (although stare decisis
constitutes important element of judicial policy, stare decisis must be concept of policy and
not of mechanical adherence); Trust Co. of Ga. v. Kenny, 188 Ga. 243, 250, 3 S.E.2d 553,
556 (1939) (quantum of precedent may be on one side while quality of precedent may be
on another); I W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIIs *69-70 (because law is perfection of reason,
prior unreasoned decisions are not law); Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision,
2 VILL. L. REv. 367, 367-69 (1957) (courts' own precedents do not inexorably bind courts).
146. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 204.
147. Id. The Second Circuit in Pforzheimer recognized that the initiation of a federal
criminal trial depended completely upon a federal prosecutor. Id.
148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that, because nature of federal
and state crimes substantially overlap, either federal or state authorities can prosecute
defendants for same offenses).
149. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960) (if federal courts admit
evidence that state officers obtained unlawfully, but exclude evidence that federal officers
obtained in same manner, courts induce prosecutors to forum shop).
150. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 204.
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violated state law.' The Pforzheimer court did not recognize, however,
that, because of the Erie doctrine, federal courts often decide issues of
state law that a state's courts have not yet decided.1 52 Federal courts would
have no more difficulty with applying state constitutional law to searches
and seizures than federal courts have, under the Erie doctrine, with
applying state law to substantive issues in civil cases.' 5 3 The Second
Circuit's decision in Pforzheimer, therefore, like the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Chavez-Vernaza, rests on uniform precedent but little compelling
analysis. 15
4
Decisions such as Chavez-Vernaza and Pforzheimer illustrate federal
courts' desire to avoid applying state constitutional law to determine the
admissibility of evidence, even if state officers alone obtained the evi-
dence.' 55 Although no well-reasoned precedent or policy reasons underlie
these decisions, federal courts uniformly refuse to exclude evidence that
state officers obtained in violation of state law. 5 6 Federal courts that
refuse to exclude evidence on state constitutional grounds, however, en-
croach upon state sovereignty by negating states' historic ability indepen-
dently to protect their citizens' individual liberties. 5 7 Moreover, federal
courts that admit unlawfully obtained evidence contravene the primary
purpose behind the states' adoption of the federal Bill of Rights, to protect
state citizens from the federal government.' 58 Finally, federal courts which
refuse to exclude evidence that state officials secured in violation of a
151. Id. The United States Supreme Court established in United States v. Oliver that a
search without a warrant of a defendant's "open fields" does not violate the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution. See United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)
(evidence that officers secured by trespassing upon defendant's open fields is admissible
under United States Constitution). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Pforzheimer noted that, although the search and seizure clause in the Vermont
Constitution differed slightly from the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, no
Vermont appellate court ever had addressed the open fields doctrine of Oliver under the
state constitution. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 202.
152. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (Erie doctrine causes federal courts
more difficulty than rule requiring interpretation of state constitution in state search and
seizure case would cause federal courts).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 92-124 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's decision
in Chavez-Vernaza); supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
decision in Pforzheimer).
155. See supra notes 92-124, 126-54 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that
courts in Chavez-Vernaza and Pforzheimer refused to exclude evidence which solely state
officers obtained in violation of state law).
156. See supra note 6 alld accompanying text (listing federal court decisions refusing
to exclude evidence that state officers obtained in violation of state law).
157. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text (by admitting evidence that state
officers seized in violation of state constitution, federal courts negate efficacy of state
constitutions).
158. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (primary reason that states requested
and adopted federal Bill of Rights was to protect citizens from newly formed national
government).
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state constitution encourage forum shopping and sanction a new reverse
silver platter doctrine, a doctrine that the United States Supreme Court
consistently has attempted to eradicate.
59
Notwithstanding its detractors, the exclusionary rule continues to achieve
the goal of enforcing constitutional rights by deterring official lawless-
ness. 60 State constitutions and state exclusionary rules are historically
more forceful than the federal exclusionary rule, because both state con-
stitutions and state exclusionary rules predate their federal counterparts.' 6'
Federal courts, therefore, should respect state sovereignty and established
principles of federalism by excluding evidence that state officials obtained
in violation of a state constitution. 62 Thus, federal courts finally could
foreclose one of the last remaining routes for admitting unlawfully seized
evidence and could eliminate the forum shopping and deprivation of




159. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, in which Supreme Court hoped to eliminate final avenue
of admissibility for unlawfully obtained evidence).
160. See Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHi. L. Rav. 1016-55 (1987) (documenting exclusionary rule's
significant efficacy in deterring police officers from acting unlawfully).
161. See supra notes 73, 80-82 and accompanying text (state constitutions and state
exclusionary rules preceded federal constitution and federal exclusionary rule).
162. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (federal courts that admit evidence
which state officers obtained in violation of state constitution ignore established principles
of federalism); supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (federal courts that admit evidence
which state officers obtained in violation of state constitution subvert underlying purpose
of federal Bill of Rights); cf. Note, United States v. McNulty: Title III and the Admissibility
in Federal Court of Illegally Gathered State Evidence, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1714, 1751 (1986)
(rule rendering illegally gathered state evidence inadmissible in any state or federal court
would reduce forum shopping and reduce incentives for state officials to violate state law).
163. See supra notes 79-90, 148-49 and accompanying text (federal courts that admit
evidence which state officers unlawfully seized eviscerate state constitutional protection and
foster forum shopping).
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